

Tape 23
Side A, 0- 1 7/8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of State,
8 September 1979

1. Late in the afternoon of 8 September, I received a copy of a revised set of talking points for the Secretary of State to use with Ambassador Dobrynin on the question of the Soviet brigade in Cuba. ~~After~~ I sent this to ^{DISC} NEAC and the NIO/USSR. They gave me their written comments that evening and the next morning I called the Secretary of State ~~to~~ and passed the following comments to him.

a. This draft was an improvement over the previous one.

b. I was concerned that the first paragraph used words like "profound reaction" and "public opinion," placed undue emphasis on the impact the public attitudes towards this problem was having on our position. I did not believe the Soviets would genuinely understand or accept the fact that we could neither manipulate public opinion or ignore it in this respect.



d. We could add a degree of threat to this if we further, then, said how would you feel if suddenly you learned that the United States

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000200050002-6


Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000200050002-6

25X1



i. I suggested on page 1, paragraph 2, that he make the following change: "It is important for us to have as soon as possible complete information on the brigade, particularly since it is clearly not playing an advisory role and clearly is in excess of the needs of your intelligence facilities."

j. I said that I was concerned that the Soviets would simply come back and describe the unit as either advisory or intelligence collecting. We were very clear in the intelligence community that neither of these was the mission of the unit. I therefore hoped that we could warn the Soviets not to come back with that excuse and put us on a debate which would be very difficult.



25X1

2. The Secretary said he would give these points very serious consideration.

ST
Director